


# Prisoner's Dilemma




 Two prisoners have to decide to confess or not.




- Two prisoners have to decide to confess or not.
- If they both stay silent, they go to prison for a year.
   reward = (0,0)




- Two prisoners have to decide to confess or not.
- If they both stay silent, they go to prison for a year.
   reward = (0,0)
- If they both confess, they go to prisoner for two years.
   reward = (-1,-1)




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- If only one of them,
  confesses, that one goes
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  ex. reward = (+1, -3)
- What will they do?




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Possible Payoffs from Mixed Strategies

# Matrix Game: Prisoner's Dilemma - Best Responses




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  ex. reward = (+1, -3)
- What will they do?

Best Responses for Blue Player...

# Matrix Game: Prisoner's Dilemma - Best Responses




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  ex. reward = (+1, -3)
- What will they do?

Best Responses for Red Player...


# Matrix Game: Prisoner's Dilemma - Nash Equilibrium




- Two prisoners have to decide to confess or not.
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   reward = (-1,-1)
- If only one of them, confesses, that one goes free and the other goes to jail for 3 years. ex. reward = (+1, -3)
- What will they do?


Nash must be best response for both


Nash = they both confess!





 What happens if agents consider some portion of their opponent's outcome?







- What happens if agents consider some portion of their opponent's outcome?
- Social Value Orientation (SVO)

$$\mathbf{J}_{i} = (1 - \theta_{i})J_{i} + \theta_{i}J_{-i}$$

$$\theta_{i} \in [0, 1]$$







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
$$\mathbf{J}_{i} = (1 - \theta_{i})J_{i} + \theta_{i}J_{-i}$$


$$\theta_{i} \in [0, 1]$$


- Fully Selfish:  $\theta_i=0$
- Fully Selfless  $\; \theta_i = 1 \;$















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$$\theta_{i} \in [0, 1]$$

- $\theta_i = 0$ Fully Selfish:
- Fully Selfless  $\; \theta_i = 1 \;$




 $heta_2$ 

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
 $\theta_2$ 


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



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
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
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
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






















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
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
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














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



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
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
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









 $\theta_1$ 







































become more









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




#### Matrix Game: Prisoner's Dilemma - SVO Nash Structure


"Prisoner's dilemma morphs into other well-known game types as the players' SVO change."






#### Matrix Game: Prisoner's Dilemma - SVO Nash Structure


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
Prisoner's Dilemma




 Two drivers dare each other to flinch to avoid a head on collision




- Two drivers dare each other to flinch to avoid a head on collision
- If neither flinches, they crash into each other. reward = (-3,-3)





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  ex. reward = (+1,-1)









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- What will they do?

# Matrix Game: Chicken - Best Responses



#### Matrix Game: Chicken - Best Responses



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